Competitive Dynamics of Web Sites by Maurer, Sebastian M. & Huberman, Bernardo A.
ar
X
iv
:n
lin
/0
00
30
41
v1
  [
nli
n.C
D]
  1
7 M
ar 
20
00 Competitive Dynamics of Web Sites
Sebastian M. Maurer and Bernardo A. Huberman∗
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, Palo Alto, CA 94304
November 13, 2018
Abstract
We present a dynamical model of web site growth in order to ex-
plore the effects of competition among web sites and to determine how
they affect the nature of markets. We show that under general condi-
tions, as the competition between sites increases, the model exhibits a
sudden transition from a regime in which many sites thrive simultane-
ously, to a ”winner take all market” in which a few sites grab almost
all the users, while most other sites go nearly extinct. This prediction
is in agreement with recent measurements on the nature of electronic
markets.
∗SMM thanks the Fannie and John Hertz Foundation and the Stanford Graduate Fel-
lowship for financial support. We thank Eytan Adar and Lada Adamic for stimulating
discussions.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of an information era mediated by the Internet brings about
a number of novel and interesting economic problems. Chiefly among them is
the realization that ever decreasing costs in communication and computation
are making the marginal cost of transmitting and disseminating information
essentially zero. As a result, the standard formulation of the competitive
equilibrium theory is inapplicable to the Internet economy. This is because
the theory of competitive equilibrium focuses on the dynamics of price ad-
justments in situations where both the aggregate supply and demand are a
function of the current prices of the commodities [7, 2]. Since on the Internet
the price of a web page is essentially zero, supply will always match demand,
and the only variable quantity that one needs to consider is the aggregate
demand, i.e. the number of customers willing to visit a site or download
information or software. As we will show, this aggregate demand can evolve
in ways that are quite different from those of price adjustments.
A particular instance of this different formulation of competitive dynamics
is provided by the proliferation of web sites that compete for the attention
and resources of millions of consumers, often at immense marketing and
development costs. As a result, the number of visitors alone has become a
proxy for the success of a web site, the more so in the case of advertising
based business models, where a well defined price is placed on every single
page view. In this case, most customers do not pay a real price for visiting
a web site. The only cost a visitor incurs is the time spent viewing an ad-
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banner, but this cost is very low and practically constant. Equally interesting,
visits to a web site are such that there is non-rival consumption in the sense
that one’s access to a site does not depend on other users viewing the same
site. This can be easily understood in terms of Internet economics: once the
fixed development cost of setting up a web site has been paid, it is relatively
inexpensive to increase the capacity the site needs to meet increased demand.
Thus, the supply of served web pages will always track the demand for web
pages (neglecting network congestion issues) and will be offered at essentially
zero cost.
The economics of information goods such as the electronic delivery of
web pages has recently been reviewed by Smith et. al. [13]. They show that
when the marginal reproduction cost approaches zero, new strategies and
behaviors appear, in particular with respect to bundling [3], price dispersion
[4], value pricing versus cost pricing [14], versioning [15], and complicated
price schedules [9].
Since supply matches demand when the price become negligibly small,
the only variable quantity that we will consider in our model is the aggregate
demand, i.e. the number of customers willing to visit a site. This is the
quantity for which we study the dynamics as a function of the growth and
capacity of web sites, as well as the competition between them. In particular,
we explore the effects that competitive pressures among web sites have on
their ability to attract a sizeable fraction of visitors who can in principle visit
a number of equivalent sites. This is of interest in light of results obtained by
Adamic and Huberman [1], who showed that the economics of the Internet
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are such that the distribution of visitors per site follows a power-law char-
acteristic of winner-take-all markets. They also proposed a growth model of
the Internet to account for this behavior which invokes either the continuous
appearance of new web sites or different growth rates for sites.
While such a theory accounts for the dynamics of visits to sites, it does
not take into account actions that sites might take to make potential visitors
to several similar sites favor one over the other. As we show, when such
mechanisms are allowed, the phenomenon of winner-take-all markets emerges
in a rather surprising way, and persists even in situations where no new sites
are continously created.
Our work also explains results obtained from computer simulation of com-
petition between web sites by Og˘us¸ et. al. [11]. Their experiments show that
brand loyalty and network effects together result in a form of winner-take-
all market, in which only a few sites survive. This is consistent with the
predictions of our theory.
In section 2 we present the model and illustrate its main predictions by
solving the equations in their simplest instance in section 3. In section 4 we
show that the transition from fair market share to winner-take-all persists in
the general case of competition between two sites and in section 5 we extend
our results to very many sites. We also show the appearence of complicated
cycles and chaotic outcomes when the values of the competitive parameters
are close to the transition point. A concluding section summarizes our results
and discusses their implications to electronic commerce.
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2 The Model
Consider n web sites offering similar services and competing for the same
population of users, which we’ll take to be much larger than the number
of sites. Each site engages in policies, from advertising to prize reductions,
that try to increase their share of the customer base fi. Note that while fi
is the fraction of the population that is a customer of web site i, it can be
more generally taken to be the fraction of the population aware of the site’s
existence. This could be measured by considering the number of people who
bookmark a particular site.
The time evolution of the customer fraction fi at a given site i is deter-
mined by two main factors. If there is no competition with any other sites,
the user base initially grows exponentially fast, at a rate αi, and then sat-
urates at a value βi. These values are determined by the site’s capacity to
handle a given number of visitors per unit time. If, on the other hand, other
sites offer competing services, the strength of the competition determines
whether the user will be likely to visit several competing sites (low competi-
tion levels) or whether having visited a given site reduces the probability of
visiting another (high competition level).
Specifically, the competition term can be understood as follows: if frac-
tions fi and fj of the people use sites i and j, respectively, then assuming that
the probability of using one site is independent of using another, a fraction
fifj will be using both sites. However, if both sites provide similar services,
then some of these users will stop using one or the other site. The rate at
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which they will stop using site i is given by γijfifj , and the rate at which
they abandon site j is given by γjififj (note that γij is not necessarily equal
to γji).
Mathematically the dynamics can thus be expressed as
dfi
dt
= αifi(βi − fi)−
∑
i 6=j
γijfifj , (1)
where αi is the growth rate of individual sites, βi denotes their capacity
to service a fraction of the customer base and γij is the strength of the
competition. The parameter values are such that αi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1 and
γij ≥ 0.
The system of equations (1), which determines the nonlinear dynamics of
user visits to web sites, possesses a number of attractors whose stability prop-
erties we will explore in detail ∗. In particular, we will show that as a function
of the competition level, the solutions can undergo bifurcations which render
a particular equilibrium unstable and lead to the appearance of new equi-
libria. The most striking result among them is the sudden appearance of a
winner-take-all site which captures most of the visitors, a phenomenon that
has been empirically observed in a study of markets in the web [1].
Since the complexity of the equations may obscure some the salient fea-
tures of the solutions, we will first concentrate on the simplest case exhibiting
a sharp transition from fair market share to a winner-take-all site, and then
∗The equations are functionally similar to those describing the competition between
modes in a laser [6], and to those describing prey-predator equations in ecology [10].
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consider more complicated examples.
3 Fair Market Share to Winner-Take-All
Let us first consider one of the simplest instances of the problem described
above, in which two web sites have the same growth rates α1 = α2 = 1, the
same capacities β1 = β2 = 1 and symmetric competion γ12 = γ21 = γ. In
this case the equations take the form
df1
dt
= f1(1− f1 − γf2)
df2
dt
= f2(1− f2 − γf1)
The four fixed points of this equation, which determine the possible equi-
libria, are given by
(f1, f2) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (
1
1 + γ
,
1
1 + γ
)}
Since not all of these equilibria are stable under small perturbations, we
need to determine their time evolution when subjected to a sudden small
change in the fraction of visitors to any site. To do this, we need to compute
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at each of the four fixed points.
The Jacobian is
J =

 1− 2f
0
1 − γf
0
2 −γf
0
1
−γf 02 1− 2f
0
2 − γf
0
1


7
and the eigenvalues at each of the fixed points are given in the following
table:
equilibrium eigenvalues
(0, 0) 1 (twice)
( 1
1+γ
, 1
1+γ
) −1 and γ−1
1+γ
(1, 0) or (0, 1) 1
2
(−γ ±
√
(2− γ)2)
From this it follows that the fixed point (0, 0) is never stable. On the
other hand, the equilibrium at ( 1
1+γ
, 1
1+γ
) is stable provided that γ < 1. And
the fixed points (0, 1) and (1, 0) are both stable if γ > 1. From these results,
we can plot the equilibrium size of the customer population as a function of
the competition γ between the two competitors. As Figure 1 shows, there is
a sudden, discontinuous transition at γ = 1. For low competition, the only
stable configuration has both competitors sharing the market equally. For
high competition, the market transitions into a ”Winner-Take-All Market”
[5], in which one competitor grabs all the market share, whereas the other
gets nothing.
As we will show below, this sudden transition persists under extremely
general conditions, for two competitors as well as for n competitors. The
significant feature is that a very small change in the parameters can radically
affect the qualitative nature of the equilibrium.
Another feature is that near the transition, the largest eigenvalue of the
stable state is very close to zero (but negative). This means that the time
of convergence to equilibrium diverges. In more complicated systems, this
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Figure 1: (a) Equilibrium values for f1 and (b) largest eigenvalues of the
Jacobian for the ( 1
1+γ
, 1
1+γ
) fixed point (dark) and the (1, 0) fixed points
(light), as a function of the competition value γ.
may make it extremely difficult to predict which equilibrium the system will
converge to in the long term.
4 Competition between two sites
We now analyse the two site model in its most general form, without restrict-
ing the values of the parameters to be the same for the two sites. The system
of equations is
df1
dt
= f1(α1(β1 − f1)− γ12f2)
df2
dt
= f2(α2(β2 − f2)− γ21f1)
As in the previous section these equations possess four fixed points at:
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(f 01 , f
0
2 ) = (0, 0)
(f 01 , f
0
2 ) = (β1, 0)
(f 01 , f
0
2 ) = (0, β2)
(f 01 , f
0
2 ) = (
α2(α1β1 − β2γ12)
α1α2 − γ12γ21
,
α1(α2β2 − β1γ21)
α1α2 − γ12γ21
)
Let’s analyze the stability of each fixed point. This is done by evaluating
the Jacobian
J =

 α1β1 − 2α1f
0
1 − γ12f
0
2 −γ12f
0
1
−γ21f
0
2 α2β2 − 2α2f
0
2 − γ21f
0
1


and computing its two eigenvalues. Each fixed point will be stable only if
the real parts of both eigenvalues are negative. The first trivial fixed point
is always unstable, since the eigenvalues α1β1 and α2β2 are both positive
quantities. The second equilibrium, with (f1, f2) = (β1, 0) is stable provided
γ12
α1
> β1
β2
. The third equilibrium (f1, f2) = (0, β2) is similarly stable only if
γ21
α2
> β2
β1
. The final case is the most complicated one, and is stable in three
distinct regimes. However, two of the stable solutions have a negative f1 or
f2 and can never be reached from an initial condition with both populations
positive. The only remaining equilibrium is stable whenever the other two
aren’t. In order to summarize these results in the table below, it is convenient
to define the following parameters:
α =
α1
α2
β =
β1
β2
γ1 =
γ12
α1
γ2 =
γ21
α2
.
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equilibrium stable if
(0, 0) never
(β1, 0) β >
1
γ2
(0, β2) β < γ1
(β1−β2γ1
1−γ1γ2
, β2−β1γ2
1−γ1γ2
) β > γ1 β <
1
γ2
Note that in the last row, β > γ1 and β <
1
γ2
imply that γ1γ2 < 1. As a
result, for fixed γ1 and γ2, there are two different regimes. Either γ1γ2 < 1, in
which case intermediate values of β (γ1 < β <
1
γ2
) lead to a ”fair” equilibrium
in which both sites get a non zero fi, or γ1γ2 < 1, in which case intermediate
values of β ( 1
γ2
< β < γ1) lead to a situation in which either of the two
”winner-take-all” equilibria is stable. In this latter case, hysteresis occurs if
β slowly changes with time. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Starting from a
low value of β, the only stable equilibrium is (0, β2). If we slowly increase
the ratio β, this equilibrium remains stable, until β > γ1. At that point, the
equilibrium (0, β2) becomes unstable and the system relaxes to the only new
equilibrium (β1, 0). If we now reverse the process, and decrease the value of
β, the new solution remains stable as long as β > 1
γ1
.
Thus, there always is at least one stable equilibrium, but there never are
more than two. If there are two stable equilibria, then the initial conditions
determine into which of the two the system will fall. Which of the equilibria
are stable depends on a total of three parameters (down from the five param-
eters that are required to fully describe the system once the time variable is
rescaled).
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Figure 2: Hysteresis behavior as β is changed with γ1 and γ2 fixed.
It is interesting to ask which of the two sites will win as a function of a
set of fixed parameters and as a function of the starting point. To do this,
we plot the motion of (f1, f2) as a vector field in Figure 3, for a particular
set of parameters. As can be seen, the space of initial conditions is divided
into two distinct regions, each of which leads to a different equilibrium.
5 Many sites
5.1 Analytic treatment
We now show that the sharp transition to a winner-take-all market that we
found in the two site case is also present when many sites are in competition.
In order to do so, we first examine the case where the parameters are the
same for all sites, i, so that Equation (1) can be rewritten as
dfi
dt
= fi(αβ − αfi − γ
∑
i 6=j
fj).
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Figure 3: Basins of attraction for the solutions to a winner-take-all market
as a function of the initial market share, for α1 = 1, α2 = 0.8, β1 = 0.8,
β2 = 0.7, γ12 = 1.5 and γ21 = 1.2
where i = 1, . . . , n and n is the number of sites. For n equations, there are 2n
different vectors (f1, . . . , fn) for which all the time derivatives are zero, since
for each equation, either fi = 0 or αβ − αfi −
∑
i 6=j γfj = 0 at equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, we can relabel the fi such that the first k of them
are non-zero, while the remaining n are zero.
At equilibrium, the value of the fi with 1 ≤ i ≤ k will be given by the
solution of
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

α γ . . . γ
γ α . . . γ
...
...
. . .
...
γ γ . . . α




f1
f2
...
fk


=


αβ
αβ
...
αβ


Except for the degenerate cases, the matrix on the left hand side is in-
vertible, so that
fi =


αβ
α+(k−1)γ
if 1 ≤ i ≤ k
0 if k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
We are now ready to compute the Jacobian about this equilibrium. It
takes the form
J =


X Y . . . Y 0 . . . 0
Y X . . . Y 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
Y Y . . . X 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 Z . . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . Z


where
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X = αβ − (2α+ (k − 1)γ)
αβ
α + (k − 1)γ
Y = −γ
αβ
α + (k − 1)γ
Z = αβ − kγ
αβ
α + (k − 1)γ
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are Z (with multiplicity n − k), X − Y
(with multiplicity k − 1) and X + (k − 1)Y (with multiplicity 1). Note that
the last two eigenvalues are absent if k = 0. Thus there are four distinct
cases to check: k = 0, k = 1, 1 < k < n and k = n. In the first case, the
only eigenvalues are Z = αβ > 0, so this solution is always unstable.
With k = 1, the eigenvalues are
X = −αβ
Z = (α− γ)β
That is, an equilibrium with one out of n winners is stable provided α < γ.
Note that this is the same condition we obtained for two competitors.
With 1 < k < n we have the eigenvalues
Z = αβ
α− γ
α + (k − 1)γ
X − Y = αβ
γ − α
α + (k − 1)γ
X + (k − 1)Y = −αβ
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The first and second eigenvalues above can not be negative simultane-
ously, thus there are no stable solutions with 1 < k < n.
Finally, for k = n we have the same eigenvalues as for 1 < k < n, except
that the eigenvalue Z is now inexistent. As a result, the solution with k = n
is stable provided that γ < α.
To summarize, the only stable solutions are
fi =


αβ
α+(n−1)γ
if γ < 1
βδij if γ > 1
That is, the winner-take-all dynamics observed for two sites persists in-
dependently of the number of competitors involved, at least in an idealized
symmetric configuration. In the next section, we consider the dynamics for
large systems in which the parameter value are drawn from a random distri-
bution.
5.2 Critical dynamics
In the most general case, the dynamical change in the fraction of visitors to
web sites can be determined by numerically solving the general equations of
our model. In addition, provided the number of sites n remains small one can
check each of the 2n candidate equilibria for stability and verify whether the
numerical simulation converged to the only equilibrium or missed an existing
but hard to reach equilibrium.
In Figure 4, we show the time evolution of fi for sixteen web sites, ob-
16
1.0
0.5
0.0
f i
50403020100
Time
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
f i
3002001000
Time
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Solutions obtained by numerical integration for two different distri-
butions of parameters. In (a) we are below the transition to winner-take-all,
with γ¯ = 0.5, while in (b) we are above the transition to winner-take-all,
with γ¯ = 1.5. In both cases αi = βi = 1 for all i.
tained by numerically integrating the equations using a Runge-Kutta scheme.
The parameters defining the competitive strength between sites, γij, were
randomly chosen from a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of
0.1, and a fixed mean γ¯. On the left panel we exhibit a solution for γ¯ = 0.5,
far below the transition point. On the right panel, γ¯ = 1.5 places us well
above the transition, and we observe the evolution towards a winner-take-
all market. Whereas below the transition the equilibrium has all sixteen
competitors sharing the market, above it one web site takes all visitors.
Given the fixed set of parameters for the model, it is possible to diago-
nalize the Jacobian, evaluated at each of the 2n = 216 fixed points. As in the
case of the symmetric case, or for the general two site case, only one equi-
librium is stable when γ¯ ≪ 1. In addition, the values of the fi at the single
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stable equilibrium found in this manner match the values that the numerical
simulation converges to.
When γ¯ ≫ 1, numerically diagonalizing the 2n Jacobians shows that the n
equilibria of the form fi = δik, and no others, are stable. Thus the transition
to a winner-take-all market subsists even when the parameters come from a
randomized distribution.
A more interesting situation is posed by the dynamics of competition
when the competitive strength approaches the critical value, γ¯ ≈ 1. Since
near the transition point the largest eigenvalue has an absolute value very
close to zero the transients to equilibrium are very long. Moreover, the nature
of the transients is such that many sites alternate in their market dominance
for long periods of time.
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
f i
40003000200010000
Time
Figure 5: Dynamics near the transition to winner-take-all, for the same pa-
rameters as in Figure 4, but with γ¯ = 1.0.
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Numerical diagonalization of all the possible Jacobians near criticality
shows that frequently there are several stable equilibria, in which some sites
have non-zero fi, and some sites don’t. However, these solutions typically are
not reached in a finite amount of time (if at all) when numerically integrating
the equations. Furthermore, numerical integration, as shown in Figure 5,
suggests that for this range of parameters the dynamics are chaotic (small
differences in the initial conditions lead to diverging trajectories). For some
initial conditions the system may converge to limit cycles, rather that to
static equilibria. Thus, when the parameter values of γij are drawn from a
distribution, the transition is not sudden in γ¯. There is a range of values of
γ¯ for which the dynamics are more complicated.
For much larger n, it is no longer possible to verify every single candidate
fixed point for stability. However, it is still possible to numerically integrate
the equations. Either way, as the example in Figure 5 shows, the question
of existence and stability of the equilibria is irrelevant if the stable equilibria
are never reached, or only reached after an unreasonable amount of time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that under general conditions, as the competition
between web sites increases, there is a sudden transition from a regime in
which many sites thrive simultaneously, to a ”winner take all market” in
which a few sites grab almost all the users, while most other sites go nearly
extinct, in agreement with the observed nature of electronic markets. This
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transition is the result of a nonlinear interaction among sites which effectively
reduces the growth rate of a given site due to competitive pressures from the
others. Without the interaction term, web sites would grow exponentially
fast to a saturation level that depends on their characteristic properties.
Moreover, we have shown that the transition into a winner-take-all market
occurs under very general conditions and for very many sites. In the limiting
case of two sites, the phenomenon is reminiscent of the ”Principle of Mutual
Exclusion” in ecology [10, 8, 12], in which two predators of the same prey
can not coexist in equilibrium when competitive predation is very strong.
Smith et. al. [13, 4] attribute the price dispertion of goods sold online
to several features of web sites: differences in branding and trust, in the
appearance and in the quality of the search tools, switching costs between
sites, and last but not least retailer awareness. A winner-take-all economy
may thus have strong consequences for price dispertion, since a few sites can
charge more by virtue of dominating the mind share of their customers.
It is interesting to speculate about the applicability of this model to
different markets. We motivated the model for a massless Internet economy,
in which demand can be instantly satisfied by supply at a negligible cost to
the supplier, and in which competition does not occur on the basis of cost,
but rather on advertising and differentiation in the services provided by the
web sites. However, since winner-take-all markets are being observed in a
much broader range of markets, it might well be the case that the sudden
transition to winner-take-all behavior might also be a feature of these markets
as well.
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